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THIRD THOUGHTS ON RUST v. SULLIVAN 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT-DEAN 
STONE'S SUPPOSED KILLER HYPO 
Professor Van Alstyne had it right the first time, when he de-
fended the Supreme Court's decision in Rust v. Sullivan on the 
ground that it is no offense to the first amendment for government 
to fund one kind of professional consulting service but not another, 
and to insist upon that choice by directing what kind of consultive 
service it is paying for and to refuse to allow some other program to 
be furthered "on its nickel." It had seemed to me that if the pre-
ferred and disadvantaged messages had been more closely aligned 
with standard predilections, this would have been better appreci-
ated. (Some suggestions: high school anti-smoking counseling or 
programs promoting racial tolerance.) 
But Van Alstyne seemed to be stumped by a counter example 
offered by Dean Stone: government funds legal assistance to poor 
but non-indigent criminal defendants, and precludes advice about 
fourth amendment rights in a way thought to be analogous to the 
Title X preclusion of advice about abortion rights. The distinctions 
between the two cases offered by Dean Stone both involve judg-
ments so complex, fancy and controversial as to put in doubt 
whether the two cases really can be distinguished and that therefore 
the Rust rationale must fail. But there is a ready and straightfor-
ward distinction that condemns the fourth amendment case and 
leaves the Court's (and Van Alstyne's) reasoning quite intact. 
In addition to the fourth amendment right (which is the ana-
logue to the Roe right) there are independent constitutional rights 
to due process of law and assistance of counsel. Government inter-
ference with a defendant's criminal defense in the way suggested in 
the hypothetical offers an argument that one or both of these consti-
tutional rights have been violated in any ensuing trial and convic-
tion. But in the Title X case there is no independent constitutional 
right apart from the Roe right (which analogizes to the fourth 
amendment right). To invoke Roe again is double counting. Or it 
is to posit an affirmative right to government assistance in the exer-
cise of Roe rights-which is just what Harris v. McRae settled to the 
contrary, and it was the real purpose of this litigation to unsettle. 
Or it is to suggest that there is some right to uninterfered with med-
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ical advice, to a doctor-patient relation that satisfies the canons of 
the AMA, or some other such thing. There may be such rights as a 
matter of morality or of professional ethics, but they are not consti-
tutional rights. And to argue that the right in the counselling situa-
tion is just the first amendment free speech right is to argue in a 
circle. 
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